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NOTES 
COMITY CONCERNS ARE NO JOKE:  
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
UNDER DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
PREEMPTION 
Marc P. Epstein* 
 
This Note gives the legal background of the doctrine of dormant foreign 
affairs preemption, examines the laws governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments under the lens of dormant foreign affairs preemption, and argues 
that courts should adopt an objective standard for future dormant foreign 
affairs preemption cases. 
Dormant foreign affairs preemption is premised on the idea that the 
federal government should have exclusive control over foreign affairs.  The 
doctrine allows courts to preempt state laws in some cases where there is 
no conflicting federal policy or statute.  The U.S. Supreme Court has only 
once held a state statute unconstitutional under the doctrine.  In addition, 
not all scholars agree that courts should apply dormant foreign affairs 
preemption, and many argue the federal government merely has supreme, 
rather than exclusive, authority in foreign affairs.  However, lower courts 
continue to apply a wide variety of tests to preserve the federal 
government’s exclusive role in foreign affairs. 
Dormant foreign affairs preemption is best understood by exploring an 
area of law that captures the competing interests in current dormant 
foreign affairs preemption analyses.  This Note considers the laws 
governing the recognition of foreign judgments, an area of traditional state 
competence that also has a substantial and growing impact on modern 
conceptions of foreign affairs. 
Finally, this Note argues that courts would benefit from applying an 
objective standard that looks at whether other countries would reasonably 
expect the federal government to have exclusive jurisdiction over an area of 
law.  Unlike current standards, this analysis accounts for changing notions 
of foreign affairs and protects against encroachments on state sovereignty.  
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2010, University of 
Rochester.  I would like to thank my faculty adviser, Professor Marc Arkin, for her 
invaluable insight and guidance, as well as my family and friends for their patience and 
support. 
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Under the objective standard, the federal government would have exclusive 
jurisdiction over regulation of the recognition of foreign judgments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Forty-seven Ecuadorans (the Lago Agrio plaintiffs) won an $18 billion 
Ecuadoran judgment against the oil giant Chevron Corporation in February 
2011.1  The Lago Agrio plaintiffs live in an area of the Amazonian rain 
forest that was only inhabited by indigenous tribes until another oil 
corporation, Texaco, led a consortium of companies in oil drilling 
throughout the Amazon from 1967 to 1992.2  The Lago Agrio plaintiffs 
claim that throughout this time, Texaco dumped 18 billion gallons of toxic 
waste in their region and “left behind hundreds of open pits full of 
malignant black sludge,” causing “cancer deaths, miscarriages, birth 
defects, dead livestock, sick fish, and the near-extinction of several tribes.”3  
Chevron claims that Texaco’s stake in the consortium was only 37 percent, 
and therefore its liability is limited to 37 percent of any damage.4  Further, 
Chevron claims that, in 1998, the Ecuadoran government released Texaco 
from any future claims after Texaco spent $40 million cleaning up 37 
percent of the pits.5 
The litigation has lasted over twenty years and is “now considered one of 
the nastiest legal contests in memory, a spectacle almost as ugly as the 
pollution that prompted it.”6  The lawsuit began in 1993, when lawyers filed 
a class action on behalf of 30,000 Ecuadorans in the Southern District of 
New York.7  In 2001, a federal judge dismissed the case on forum non 
conveniens8 grounds, holding that the case had “everything to do with 
Ecuador and nothing to do with the United States.”9  In 2003, the Lago 
Agrio plaintiffs refiled their case in Ecuador, and in 2011, an Ecuadoran 
court entered the multibillion dollar judgment in favor of the Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs.10 
The lawsuit returned to the Southern District of New York in 2011, when 
Chevron sued the Lago Agrio plaintiffs’ lead attorney, Steven Donziger, 
 
 1. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d sub 
nom. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct 423 (2012).  
Since February 2011, the Ecuadoran Supreme Court has reduced the judgment to $9.5 
billion. Roger Parloff, Chevron Alleges Still Another Fraud by Ecuadorians, CNN MONEY 
(Nov. 26, 2013, 8:02 AM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/11/26/chevron-
alleges-still-another-fraud-by-ecuadorians/. 
 2. Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune:  The Lago Agrio Litigation, 1 STAN. J. 
COMPLEX LITIG. 199, 199 (2013).  Chevron inherited the lawsuit, which was originally 
against Texaco, when it acquired Texaco in 2001. Id. at 200. 
 3. Id. at 199. 
 4. Id. at 209. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 200. 
 7. Id. at 203. 
 8. Forum non conveniens allows courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over a 
lawsuit, even where the court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction and venue is 
proper, when another forum would be more convenient. C.P. Jhong, Application of 
Common-Law Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Courts After Enactment of 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a) Authorizing Transfer to Another District, 10 A.L.R. FED. 352, § 1(a) 
(1972). 
 9. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 10. Keefe, supra note 2, at 199, 203. 
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and others for violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO); state claims of fraud, tortious interference with 
contract, and trespass to chattels; unjust enrichment; civil conspiracy; 
violations of New York Judiciary Law governing the conduct of lawyers; 
and for a declaratory judgment that the $18 billion Ecuadoran judgment was 
not entitled to recognition or enforcement in the United States or 
elsewhere.11  In particular, Chevron argued that Donziger “exploit[ed] the 
corruption of the Ecuadoran system,” rendering the judgment 
unrecognizable and unenforceable.12  The district court granted the global 
injunction based on New York’s statute governing the recognition of 
foreign judgments.13 
The Second Circuit later vacated the judgment.14  For one, granting the 
injunction was improper under New York’s recognition law, which does not 
authorize such an injunction.15  Additionally, according to the Second 
Circuit, the district court may have violated principles of “international 
comity.”16 
International comity is the practice among nations to recognize, within 
their territories, the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of other nations 
with “due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the 
rights of [their] own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of [their] laws.”17  Comity is not a matter of obligation;18 
however, comity promotes cooperation, reciprocity, and international 
courtesy.19  In the long term, adhering to comity improves the positions of 
cooperating countries.20 
 
 11. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d 
sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct 423 
(2012).  The court later held that the judgment was unrecognizable because it was procured 
by fraud. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 
2014); Christie Smythe and Patricia Hurtado, Chevron Wins U.S. Ruling Calling Ecuador 
Judgment Fraud, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2014-03-04/ecuador-judgment-against-chevron-ruled-a-fraud-by-u-s-.html. 
 12. Keefe, supra note 2, at 211.  Chevron gained access to video footage, internal 
emails, and even Donziger’s own diary, which showed that Donziger and his colleagues 
ghostwrote an independent environmental-damages assessment, as well as persuaded a judge 
to grant the multibillion dollar judgment for personal reasons. See id. at 210–14; see also 
Donziger, 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK), slip op. at 2. 
 13. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 632–33 (applying N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(a)–(b) 
(MCKINNEY 2011)). 
 14. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 at 247; see also infra notes 350–62 (elaborating on the 
Second Circuit’s opinion). 
 15. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 242–44. 
 16. Id. at 244. 
 17. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–164 (1895); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
303 (9th ed. 2009) (defining comity). 
 18. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–164. 
 19. Ayelet Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, The Constitution and Conflict-of-Laws 
Treaties:  Upgrading the International Comity, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 9–10 
(2003). 
 20. Id. at 10; Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 339–44 
(1990) (arguing that when states are involved in repeated prisoner’s dilemmas involving 
different strategies on choice of law, states adopt reciprocity). 
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While the states promulgate the laws governing the recognition of 
foreign judgments,21 those laws are intertwined with concepts of 
international comity and foreign affairs.  For example, the district court’s 
nonrecognition of the Ecuadoran judgment involved a determination that 
Ecuador’s judicial system was inadequate to the point that a court applying 
New York law could not recognize Ecuadoran judgments.22  Further, the 
district court’s global injunction insulted the legal systems of other 
countries, which the court deemed “insufficiently trustworthy” to evaluate 
the judgment.23 
State laws that affect foreign policy, such as laws governing the 
recognition of foreign judgments, raise constitutional concerns.  Those 
concerns are often dealt with through preemption doctrines, which allow 
courts to hold state statutes unconstitutional.24  Dormant foreign affairs 
preemption is the doctrine that deals with state laws that affect foreign 
policy when there is no conflicting federal law or policy.25  The doctrine is 
based on the idea that the federal government has exclusive authority over 
foreign affairs.26 
The Constitution neither explicitly grants the federal government 
exclusive authority over, nor explicitly excludes the states from, foreign 
affairs.27  However, the text of the Constitution, historical context, and U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence to some extent support federal exclusivity in 
foreign affairs.28  Critics of federal exclusivity draw on the same categories 
of evidence to show that the federal government is limited to supremacy, as 
opposed to exclusivity, in foreign affairs.29  But significantly, the Supreme 
Court has held a state statute unconstitutional solely because of its impact 
on foreign affairs.30  Furthermore, because the Court has remained largely 
silent on the issue of preemption in the absence of a conflicting federal 
statute or policy since its decision in 1968,31 lower courts have applied a 
wide array of tests to exclude states from foreign affairs.32 
 
 21. See infra Part II.B.  Unless otherwise noted, “foreign judgments” in this Note refers 
to foreign money judgments. 
 22. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct 
423 (2012). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See infra Part I.B. 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
 27. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 28. See infra Part I.C. 
 29. See infra Part I.C. 
 30. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968); see also infra Part I.B.  Zschernig is 
distinguishable within Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence because most preemption 
doctrines require the presence of a conflicting federal statute in order to invalidate a state 
statute. See infra Part I.A. 
 31. This is with the exception of one case, in which the Court specifically addressed the 
unsettled doctrine in dictum. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 
(2003); see also infra notes 78–92 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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This Note addresses the scope of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs,33 
and proposes a new standard for evaluating issues under dormant foreign 
affairs preemption.  The current analyses either do not account for changing 
notions of foreign affairs or fail to protect against encroachments on state 
sovereignty.  An objective standard that looks to whether other sovereigns 
would reasonably expect the federal government to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain areas of law accounts for both considerations. 
This Note also analyzes the law governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments.  The recognition of foreign judgments captures the competing 
interests in dormant foreign affairs preemption analyses, and highlights the 
need for an adequate standard.  The law regulating the recognition of 
foreign judgments in the United States has long been within the domain of 
the states, and yet its impact on modern conceptions of foreign affairs is 
both apparent and growing.34 
Part I of this Note provides background on preemption, introduces 
Supreme Court and lower court jurisprudence on dormant foreign affairs 
preemption, and outlines the justifications and criticisms of the doctrine.  
Part II introduces and analyzes the law governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments and looks at its impact on foreign affairs.  Part III critiques 
current dormant foreign affairs preemption standards, proposes a new 
objective standard for dormant foreign affairs preemption analysis, and 
evaluates the recognition of foreign judgments under the new standard. 
I.  A SOMEWHAT EXCLUSIVE CLUB:  FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION 
Part I.A reviews the various doctrines of foreign affairs preemption.  Part 
I.B considers the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs preemption and 
reviews Supreme Court and lower court cases implicating the doctrine.  Part 
I.C analyzes the arguments in support and against dormant foreign affairs 
preemption and federal exclusivity in foreign affairs. 
A.  Preemption Doctrines 
Article VI of the Constitution establishes the supremacy of federal law 
over state law.35  The supremacy of federal law means that federal law 
overrides state law in cases where the two conflict.36  Preemption can be an 
 
 33. Defining the scope of dormant foreign affairs preemption is essential, even as 
scholars debate the foundations of dormant foreign affairs preemption, see infra Part I.C, 
since courts continue to hold state statutes unconstitutional without a conflicting federal 
statute or policy, see infra Part I.B. 
 34. See infra Part II. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).  This is commonly known as the Supremacy 
Clause. 
 36. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770 
(1994). 
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even greater limitation on state power.37  Preemption means, “(a) that states 
are deprived of their power to act at all in a given area, and (b) that this is 
so whether or not state law is in conflict with federal law.”38 
“Preemption” refers to a wide array of doctrines, including statutory 
preemption, obstacle preemption, and dormant preemption.39  Statutory 
preemption doctrines all have the same underpinning:  a federal statute is at 
issue.40  The judiciary’s role, therefore, is to determine whether Congress 
intended the federal statute to preempt the state law.41  The first statutory 
preemption doctrine is express preemption, which “occurs when a statute on 
its face addresses preemption.”42  There are also three doctrines of implied 
statutory preemption:  conflict preemption, and two variations of field 
preemption.43  Under conflict preemption, courts may preempt a statute 
when it is impossible to comply with both a federal statute and a state 
statute.44  Field preemption can occur when:  (1) a federal regulatory 
scheme is “so pervasive” that Congress could not have intended for states to 
supplement it, or (2) a federal interest is “so dominant” that state laws in the 
field should not be enforced.45 
Similar to statutory preemption is obstacle preemption.  In cases that 
employ obstacle preemption, a court “identifies the ‘purposes and 
objectives’ of a federal statute that is silent about preemptive scope” and 
determines whether the “state statute ‘stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment’ of these purposes and objectives.”46 
Dormant preemption doctrines do not rely on the existence of a federal 
statute.47  One dormant preemption doctrine is dormant Foreign Commerce 
Clause preemption, which requires courts to decide “whether a state law 
facially discriminates against foreign commerce or has substantial 
 
 37. Id. at 771. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 
202.  It should be noted at the outset that preemption jurisprudence is riddled with 
equivocation. See id. at 178 (“The Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence is famous for 
its incoherence.  The doctrines of preemption are vague and indeterminate.  Their relations to 
one another are unclear.  And the decisional outcomes are difficult to cohere.”).  Often, state 
statutes that violate principles of statutory preemption also raise dormant foreign affairs 
preemption issues, or in other words, issues concerning the federal government’s exclusive 
control over foreign affairs. See infra Part I.C.3. 
 40. See Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 205–06. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 205. 
 43. See id. at 206. 
 44. Id. at 205. 
 45. Id. at 206 (citations omitted). 
 46. Id. at 205–06 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)). 
 47. Id. at 204.  Some scholars argue that the absence of a conflicting federal statute in 
dormant foreign affairs preemption cases suggests that the dormant foreign affairs 
preemption is not rooted in the Supremacy Clause. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of 
the States in Foreign Affairs:  The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 348–49 (1999) (“[Dormant foreign affairs preemption] operates 
outside the scope of the Supremacy Clause, as it does not require for its invocation a 
conflicting congressional statute or treaty.  It is, instead, non-Article VI preemption.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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discriminatory effects,” and “preempts state laws that prevent the federal 
government from speaking with ‘one voice’ in foreign relations.”48  
Similarly, in another dormant preemption doctrine—federal common law of 
foreign relations—courts look to the effects of a state law on foreign affairs 
to determine whether federal common law should replace the state law.49 
The third dormant preemption doctrine is dormant foreign affairs 
preemption, which allows courts to hold state laws unconstitutional if they 
interfere with federal foreign policy.50  The theory is that the federal 
government has exclusive power over the conduct of foreign affairs, and 
that states may not encroach on this power.51  While the power to conduct 
foreign affairs is lodged in the federal political branches, states sometimes 
act in areas in which those branches have failed to act.52  In such cases, “the 
structure of the Constitution establishes a self-executing presumption . . . 
that such activity is governed by federal law.”53 
B.  Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption in the Courts 
The Supreme Court and lower courts have dealt with dormant foreign 
affairs preemption in various contexts.  The Court preempted a state statute 
under dormant foreign affairs preemption in Zschernig v. Miller54 and 
proposed a new test for the doctrine in dictum in American Insurance Ass’n 
v. Garamendi.55  Likewise, the lower courts have applied a number of 
different tests, all purportedly to maintain federal exclusivity in foreign 
affairs. 
1.  Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption  
in the Supreme Court 
The Court applied dormant foreign affairs preemption in Zschernig.56  
The sole heirs of an Oregon decedent’s estate petitioned the Court to 
overturn the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon, which held that 
their estate would escheat to the state as the requirements of an Oregon state 
statute were not satisfied.57  Where a nonresident alien claimed real or 
personal property, the Oregon statute required: 
(1) the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take 
property on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign 
country; (2) the right of United States citizens to receive payment here of 
 
 48. Goldsmith, supra note 39, at 204. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Ramsey, supra note 47, at 348. 
 51. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1617, 1620 (1997). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. 389 U.S. 429 (1968). 
 55. 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (dictum). 
 56. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441. 
 57. Id. at 430. 
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funds from estates in the foreign country; and (3) the right of the foreign 
heirs to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates “without confiscation.”58 
The Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon, 
holding that the Oregon law was unconstitutional as applied because it had 
“a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the 
power of the central government to deal with those problems.”59  
Furthermore, the Court held that it had “more than some incidental or 
indirect effect in foreign countries, and its great potential for disruption or 
embarrassment makes [the Court] hesitate to place it in the category of 
diplomatic bagatelle.”60  The Court was particularly concerned because 
state courts were inquiring into the governmental operations and protection 
of rights in foreign nations.61  Not only did the statute require Oregon 
judges to determine whether Oregon citizens shared the same rights as those 
protected by foreign law, but it also “ma[d]e unavoidable judicial criticism 
of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own.”62 
In its reasoning, the Court precariously distinguished an earlier decision, 
Clark v. Allen,63 in which the Court had upheld a California statute 
containing a similar reciprocity clause as it would only have “some 
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries.”64  The Court distinguished 
Clark because there, the Court decided only the facial constitutionality of 
the California statute; a state statute with a reciprocity clause could still be 
unconstitutional as applied.65 
Zschernig is the only case in which the Court’s holding rested entirely on 
dormant foreign affairs preemption.66  In prior cases, the Court had found 
state statutes preempted where there was a federal statute, treaty, or policy 
that conflicted with a state statute.67  However, the Court decided Zschernig 
without regard to statutory or obstacle preemption; the Court’s concern was 
solely with state intrusion into foreign policy.68  Nonetheless, the Court was 
willing to hold the state statute unconstitutional:  “Where those [state] laws 
 
 58. Id. at 430–31 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1967), repealed by 1969 Or. Laws 
1221 (1969)). 
 59. Id. at 441. 
 60. Id. at 434–35 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61. Id. at 433–34 (“States have launched inquiries into the type of governments that 
obtain in particular foreign nations—whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights, 
whether the so-called ‘rights’ are merely dispensations turning upon the whim or caprice of 
government officials, whether the representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other 
representatives of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith, [and] whether there is in 
the actual administration in the particular foreign system of law any element of 
confiscation.”). 
 62. Id. at 440. 
 63. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). 
 64. Id. at 517. 
 65. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433. 
 66. See Edward T. Swaine, The Undersea World of Foreign Relations Federalism, 2 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 337, 339 (2001) (“Most everyone was comfortable supposing that the 
national government monopolized foreign relations until the Supreme Court actually began 
applying that notion [in Zschernig].”). 
 67. For examples of such cases, see infra Part I.C.3. 
 68. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440–41. 
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conflict with a treaty, they must bow to the superior federal policy.  Yet, 
even in absence of a treaty, a State’s policy may disturb foreign 
relations.”69 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan expressed reservations with the 
Court’s broad holding and stated that he would have held the state statute 
unconstitutional because it conflicted with an earlier federal treaty with 
Germany.70  He argued that precedent supported permitting state legislation 
“in areas of [states’] traditional competence even though their statutes may 
have an incidental effect on foreign relations.”71  Moreover, he believed 
that the Court’s mistake was that its reasoning—that judicial criticism of 
foreign nations could have an effect on foreign affairs—was “based almost 
entirely on speculation”: 
[T]he Court does not mention, nor does the record reveal, any instance in 
which such an occurrence has been the occasion for a diplomatic protest, 
or, indeed, has had any foreign relations consequence whatsoever. 
. . . . 
. . . [J]udges have been known to utter dicta critical of foreign 
governmental policies even in purely domestic cases, so that the mere 
possibility of offensive utterances can hardly be the test.72 
Zschernig has proven controversial in the years since it was decided.  
Scholars point out that Zschernig is unclear in its reasoning and scope.73  
For instance, the case fails to adequately demarcate the line between 
constitutionally permissible and prohibited state and local action.74  
Moreover, the case does not provide guidance on how to distinguish 
between incidental and serious effects.75 
The Court has thus far refused to reinvoke the dormant foreign affairs 
preemption doctrine, and Supreme Court justices have criticized the 
opinion.  For instance, in her dissent in Garamendi, Justice Ginsburg 
expressed reservations about relying on Zschernig, noting, “We have not 
relied on Zschernig since it was decided, and I would not resurrect that 
decision here.”76  Further, in oral arguments in Garamendi, Chief Justice 
 
 69. Id. at 441 (citation omitted).  Justice Stewart’s concurrence was an even greater 
sanctioning of dormant foreign affairs preemption. See id. at 441–43 (Stewart, J., 
concurring)  (“[T]he conduct of our foreign affairs is entrusted under the Constitution to the 
National Government, not to the probate courts of the several States.”).  Justice Stewart also 
emphasized that the constitutionality of state laws infringing on foreign affairs should not 
depend on the “shifting winds at the State Department.” Id. at 443. 
 70. Id. at 462 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 71. Id. at 458–59. 
 72. Id. at 460–61. 
 73. See Matthew Schaefer, Constraints on State-Level Foreign Policy:  (Re) Justifying, 
Refining and Distinguishing the Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 
201, 232 (2011). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Emily Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally?  Dormant Federal Common Law 
Preemption of State and Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
923, 966 (2003). 
 76. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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Rehnquist bluntly stated, “I don’t regard [Zschernig] as a very strongly 
reasoned opinion.”77 
In addition to Zschernig, the Court addressed dormant foreign affairs 
preemption in dictum in the more recent case, Garamendi.78  California had 
enacted a statute in 1999 that required insurance companies doing business 
in California “to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe 
between 1920 and 1945 by the company itself or any one related to it.”79  
At the same time, the United States was in the midst of negotiations with 
Germany regarding this very matter.80  The negotiations culminated in the 
German Foundation Agreement, which President Clinton and German 
Chancellor Schroder signed in July 2000, and which established a German 
fund for the compensation of “those ‘who suffered at the hands of German 
companies during the National Socialist era.’”81  The United States 
supported the fund both by promising to encourage state and local 
governments to respect the foundation as an exclusive means of 
remuneration and by submitting a statement, nonbinding on U.S. courts, 
saying “it would be in the foreign policy interests of the United States for 
the Foundation to be the exclusive forum and remedy for the resolution of 
all asserted claims against German companies arising from their 
involvement in the National Socialist era and World War II.”82  The leaders 
also agreed that the German Foundation would work with the International 
Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), the 
responsibilities of which included providing information about Holocaust-
era unpaid insurance policies.83 
The Court held that the California statute was unconstitutional because it 
conflicted with a federal policy in the same domain.84  Since the California 
statute fell within an area of traditional state competence—namely, 
insurance—the Court endorsed a balancing approach to determine whether 
the federal policy preempted the state law:  courts should “consider the 
strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, 
when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the 
state law preempted.”85  In applying this test, the Court relied on Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council,86 noting that the California statute 
“undercuts the President’s diplomatic discretion” and compromised the 
 
 77. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (No. 02-722), available 
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/02-722.pdf. 
 78. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11. 
 79. Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Id. at 407. 
 81. Id. at 405 (quoting Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, 
Responsibility and the Future,” U.S.-Ger., July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298). 
 82. Id. at 406 (quoting Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, 
Responsibility and the Future,” supra note 81, at 1303). 
 83. Id. at 406–07. 
 84. Id. at 427.  Cases under this type of preemption—“obstacle preemption”—are 
discussed infra in Part I.C.3.b. 
 85. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420. 
 86. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).  For further discussion of Crosby, see infra notes 221–29 and 
accompanying text. 
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president’s ability to “‘speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with 
other governments.’”87  Moreover, in addition to an express foreign policy 
and a clear conflict, California only had a weak interest in regulating 
disclosure of the insurance policies.88 
The Court, in a footnote, also proposed a possible model for dormant 
foreign affairs preemption.89  If a state were to encroach on foreign policy 
without claiming to address “traditional state responsibility,” the Court 
would not require a conflicting federal statute or policy.90  However, where 
a state has acted within its “‘traditional competence,’ but in a way that 
affects foreign relations,” the Court would require a conflict “of a clarity or 
substantiality that would vary with the strength or the traditional importance 
of the state concern asserted.”91  The Court would also possibly weigh the 
asserted federal foreign policy interest.92 
2.  Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption  
in Lower Courts 
Lower courts apply a wide variety of tests and standards in the name of 
dormant foreign affairs preemption.93  Some courts apply the Zschernig 
test, looking to whether state laws have a direct impact on foreign affairs.94  
For example, in Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, the Third 
Circuit applied the Zschernig test to uphold a Pennsylvania law that 
required steel suppliers contracting with a public agency in connection with 
a public works project to provide American-made steel.95  After rejecting 
statutory and foreign commerce preemption challenges to the 
constitutionality of the state law, the court held that the state law did not 
raise the same foreign policy concerns as the statute in Zschernig.96 
Similarly, in Deutsch v. Turner Corp.,97 decided before Garamendi,98 the 
Ninth Circuit held that a California statute creating a cause of action for 
claims involving Second World War slave labor was unconstitutional 
despite the lack of a conflicting federal statute.99  The court held that the 
statute encroached on a field that the Constitution explicitly reserved for the 
federal government—the federal government’s power to make and resolve 
 
 87. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 423–24 (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381). 
 88. Id. at 425. 
 89. See id. at 419 n.11. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Chiang, supra note 75, at 972–73.  Chiang argues that lower court decisions may 
depend on whether a state law is, on its face, directed at a foreign nation, is generally 
applicable, or is facially neutral but is intended to address only some foreign nations. Id. at 
972–73. 
 94. See, e.g., Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 95. Id. at 904, 909. 
 96. See id. at 909. 
 97. 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 98. 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003). 
 99. Id. at 703, 715. 
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war.100  The court viewed the statute as an attempt by California to 
“rectify[] wartime wrongs committed by our enemies,”101 encroaching on 
war-related issues that were “for the federal government alone to 
address.”102 
Since Garamendi, the Ninth Circuit has applied a test that looks at the 
purposes behind state laws.103  For example, in Movsesian v. Victoria 
Versicherung AG, victims of the Armenian genocide filed suit under a 
California statute vesting California courts with jurisdiction over, and 
extending the statute of limitations of, insurance claims brought by 
Armenian genocide victims.104  Although the district court upheld the 
California statute, the Ninth Circuit reversed.105 
The court interpreted dictum in Garamendi to require a two-part test for 
preemption under Zschernig:  first, uncover the “real purpose” of a state law 
to determine whether a state has a serious claim of addressing a traditional 
state responsibility, and second, determine whether the state regulation 
intrudes on the federal government’s foreign affairs powers.106  Applying 
the test, the court first held that the state did not have a serious claim of 
addressing a traditional state responsibility because “the real purpose of [the 
state statute was] to provide potential monetary relief and a friendly forum 
for those who suffered from certain foreign events.”107  Second, the court 
held that the statute expressed a point of view and that its effect on foreign 
affairs was more than incidental.108  The court said that “[the statute] is, at 
its heart, intended to send a political message on an issue of foreign affairs 
by providing relief and a friendly forum to a perceived class of foreign 
victims.”109 
Finally, courts sometimes apply confused tests with a number of 
considerations.110  For example in Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. 
Johnson,111 the court struck down an amendment to a state law that created 
exemptions from certain taxes, but specifically excluded South Africa.112  
The court relied on an assortment of federal and state cases to derive a 
number of principles to support its holding.113  The state law was 
 
 100. Id. at 713–15. 
 101. Id. at 708. 
 102. Id. at 712.  The court also contrasted the power to make and resolve war with powers 
concerning foreign commerce, saying that statutes mainly involving foreign commerce “are 
among those least likely to be held invalid under the foreign affairs power.” Id. at 711. 
 103. See, e.g., Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 670 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir. 
2011); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 104. Movsesian, 670 F.3d at 1069. 
 105. Id. at 1077. 
 106. Id. at 1074. 
 107. Id. at 1076. 
 108. Id. at 1077. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Chiang gives a comprehensive review of such cases. See Chiang, supra note 75, at 
967–69. 
 111. 503 N.E.2d 300 (Ill. 1986). 
 112. Id. at 302. 
 113. See id. at 306–07. 
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unconstitutional because the motivation behind the amendment was 
disapproval of South Africa’s policies, the exclusion targeted a single 
foreign nation, and the practical effect of the exclusion was to impose or 
encourage an economic boycott of the South African gold coin, the 
Krugerrand.114 
C.  Legal Foundation of Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption 
The debate over the foundation and scope of dormant foreign affairs 
preemption115 takes shape around principles of federalism, the division of 
power between the federal and state governments.116  Dormant foreign 
affairs preemption rests on the argument that the federal government has 
exclusive authority in the conduct of foreign affairs.117  Proponents of the 
doctrine draw on (1) the text and structure of the Constitution; (2) historical 
context, including the intent of the founders and responses to the Articles of 
Confederation; and, (3) Supreme Court dictum to support the notion that the 
federal government has exclusive, and not just supreme, authority.118  
Critics of the doctrine draw on the same categories of evidence to show that 
while federal supremacy in foreign affairs is undeniable, federal exclusivity 
does not follow.119 
1.  The Text and Structure of the Constitution 
Proponents of dormant foreign affairs preemption argue that the 
Constitution “should be read as a whole” and interpreted in light of the 
powers granted to the federal government and denied the states.120  Thus, 
when taken together, the specific provisions “indicate an intent on the part 
of the Framers to vest foreign affairs powers in the federal government.”121  
Proponents argue that structurally, “[u]nlike power over domestic matters, 
power over foreign affairs cannot be shared without substantially impairing 
its effective exercise.”122  Proponents further support these textual 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. See generally Chiang, supra note 75 (arguing in favor of dormant foreign affairs 
preemption); Goldsmith, supra note 51 (arguing that the courts’ practice of applying the 
federal common law of foreign relations lacks justification); Ramsey, supra note 47 (arguing 
that courts should permit some state interference in foreign affairs); Swaine, supra note 66 
(discussing the constitutional context and values in foreign relations federalism); Joseph B. 
Crace, Jr., Note, Gara-mending the Doctrine of Foreign Affairs Preemption, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 203 (2004) (discussing the effects of dormant foreign affairs preemption on states’ 
ability to legislate in areas of traditional state concern). 
 116. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 
1996); Goldsmith, supra note 51 (discussing the relationship between federalism and foreign 
affairs). 
 117. See Goldsmith, supra note 51, at 1620. 
 118. See Chiang, supra note 75, at 932. 
 119. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 51, at 1665. 
 120. Chiang, supra note 75, at 934–35. 
 121. Id.; see also Ramsey, supra note 47, at 366. 
 122. Ramsey, supra note 47, at 366. 
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arguments with Supreme Court jurisprudence differentiating between 
structural assumptions for domestic and foreign affairs.123 
The textual argument against dormant foreign affairs preemption relies 
on viewing the Constitution as a structure of enumerated powers.124  Since 
the Constitution adopts such a structure, powers that are not “specifically 
granted to the federal government or denied to the states remain within the 
concurrent powers of the state and federal governments until preempted by 
a federal statute or treaty.”125 
The Constitution does not explicitly grant the judiciary the power to 
preempt state laws that interfere with foreign affairs.126  Moreover, even 
though the Founders referred to the ability to “regulate the intercourse with 
foreign nations” as a class of powers,127 the Constitution does not grant a 
single “foreign affairs” power to the federal government.128  Rather, the 
provisions empowering the federal government to regulate foreign affairs 
are scattered throughout the text of the Constitution.  For instance, among 
the enumerated powers granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8 are the 
powers to “regulate commerce with foreign nations” (the Foreign 
Commerce Clause);129 “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”;130 
“coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin”;131 “define 
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas, and Offenses 
against the Law of Nations”;132 “declare War”;133 “raise and support 
Armies”;134 and “provide and maintain a Navy.”135  Article II is likewise 
replete with foreign affairs empowerment, naming the president 
“Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”136 
granting the president the “Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties,”137 and directing the president to “receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”138  Finally, the Constitution 
grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction “[i]n all cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls.”139 
 
 123. See Chiang, supra note 75, at 935–36. 
 124. Id. at 934–35. 
 125. Id. at 934. 
 126. See Goldsmith, supra note 51, at 1641–42. 
 127. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 207 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008). 
 128. See Chiang, supra note 75, at 933. 
 129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 130. Id. cl. 4. 
 131. Id. cl. 5. 
 132. Id. cl. 10. 
 133. Id. cl. 11. 
 134. Id. cl. 12. 
 135. Id. cl. 13. 
 136. Id. § 2, cl. 1. 
 137. Id. cl. 2.  Critics of the doctrine, such as Goldsmith, argue that a primary purpose for 
establishing procedural hurdles (bicameralism, presentment, and veto requirements) with 
respect to foreign relations law “was to preserve state influence and protect state interests.” 
Goldsmith, supra note 51, at 1645. 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 139. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Just as there is no discrete grant of “foreign affairs” powers to the federal 
government in the Constitution, there is similarly no specific clause wholly 
forbidding the states from participating in “foreign affairs.”140  However, 
the Constitution does contain precise prohibitions relating to the states and 
their international reach, including that “[n]o State shall enter into any 
treaty, alliance, or confederation,”141 and 
[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of 
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any 
Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power, or engage in War, 
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of 
delay.142 
2.  Historical Context 
Scholars also view the text and structure of the Constitution in light of 
contemporaneous history.143  Scholars often draw upon The Federalist 
Papers and other sources to determine the Framers’ intent, and consider 
responses to deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation to support their 
arguments for and against federal exclusivity in foreign affairs. 
a.  The Intent of the Framers 
Supporters and detractors of dormant foreign affairs preemption 
frequently look to the Framers’ intent to substantiate their claims that the 
Constitution does or does not exclusively reserve foreign affairs powers for 
the federal government.144  While supporters of the doctrine argue that the 
Framers intended for the federal government to have exclusive authority 
over foreign affairs,145 detractors contend that the Framers at most intended 
the federal government to have supreme, not exclusive, authority.146 
In The Federalist Papers, John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander 
Hamilton each argued in favor of adopting the new Constitution.  In The 
 
 140. See generally U.S. CONST. 
 141. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 142. Id. cl. 3. 
 143. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 51, at 1643–44; Ramsey, supra note 47, at 380–82. 
 144. Compare Chiang, supra note 75, at 936–39 (arguing that The Federalist Papers 
“provide a powerful counterpoint to the anti-preemption commentary”), and Crace, supra 
note 115, at 229–30 (citing The Federalist Papers in support of a “well-grounded” 
constitutional federal foreign affairs power), with Goldsmith, supra note 51, at 1642–43 
(contending that the Framers’ intent does not support dormant foreign affairs preemption), 
and Ramsey, supra note 47, at 382 (“[T]he framers’ views relate only to the need for federal 
supremacy, not federal exclusivity.”). 
 145. E.g., Crace, supra note 115, at 230 (reviewing the passages from The Federalist 
Papers and concluding that “[the passages] indicate that the Framers intended the federal 
government to be the sole organ of foreign policy”). 
 146. Goldsmith, supra note 51, at 1643 (“[O]utside of Article I, Section 10, there is no 
evidence that the Constitution was designed to establish a judicially enforceable, self-
executing realm of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs.”); Ramsey, supra note 47, at 382 
(“[T]he framers’ views relate only to the need for federal supremacy, not federal 
exclusivity.”). 
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Federalist No. 3, John Jay argued that a national government, because of its 
uniform set of laws and government, was best equipped to handle issues 
concerning treaties and the laws of nations.147  Moreover, a uniform 
government would be more likely to observe the “law of nations” and 
therefore less likely to give other nations excuses to go to war.148  In Jay’s 
view, the decisions of a national government would also be “more wise, 
systematical, and judicious” than those made by the individual states.149  In 
particular, he believed that the national government would be more immune 
to malicious local influence and better able to counteract it.150 
Jay further argued in The Federalist No. 4 that a unified government is 
better prepared to act in defense of the “safety of the whole,” as it can draw 
on the human and military resources of the entire nation, act with uniform 
policy, and in the formation of treaties “regard the interest of the whole and 
the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole.”151  
Moreover, a united America would have superior military power, efficiency 
in the regulation of the military, and would be immune from opponents’ 
divisive tactics.152  Finally, in The Federalist No. 5, Jay warned of the 
dangers of having fully sovereign individual states that would eventually 
succumb to envy and jealousy and turn on each other.153 
In The Federalist No. 42, James Madison wrote both generally of the 
importance of national unity in foreign affairs—“[i]f we are to be one 
nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations”154—
and in support of the individual foreign affairs powers in the 
Constitution.155  He drew significantly upon the defects in the Articles of 
Confederation to demonstrate the importance of the federal foreign affairs 
powers, such as the ability to receive ambassadors and “other public 
ministers and consuls,” and the power to define and punish crimes 
committed on the high seas.156 
In The Federalist No. 44, Madison wrote specifically on restricting the 
authority of the states.157  First, Madison believed it self-evident that states 
should be restricted from entering into treaties, alliances, and 
 
 147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, supra note 127, at 20 (John Jay) (“Under the national 
government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be 
expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner—whereas adjudications on the 
same points and questions in thirteen States . . . will not always accord or be consistent.”). 
 148. Id. at 19. 
 149. Id. at 20. 
 150. Id. at 21. 
 151. Id. at 24. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. NO. 5, at 27–28 (“[T]hey would neither love nor trust one another, but on the 
contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, . . . they would 
place us exactly in the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., 
formidable only to each other.”). 
 154. Id. NO. 42, at 208 (James Madison). 
 155. Id. at 208–10. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. NO. 44. 
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confederations.158  He also justified a broad rule giving exclusive authority 
to grant letters of marque159 to the national government by stressing the 
importance of vesting the foreign affairs powers in the national government 
alone:  “This alteration is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in 
all points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to 
the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be 
responsible.”160  Additionally, Madison supported prohibiting the states 
from issuing bills of credit by arguing that retrospective alterations in their 
value might cause foreign powers to suffer, “and hence the Union be 
discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member.”161 
On the other hand, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Madison warned that 
the management of foreign affairs was particularly susceptible to 
governmental abuse for two reasons.162  First, the government has wide 
discretion in disclosing foreign relations information to the public.163  
Second, the public is less capable of judging, and therefore “more under the 
influence of prejudices,” in this area of affairs:  “Perhaps it is a universal 
truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against 
danger, real or pretended, from abroad.”164 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in support of federal judicial authority over 
cases that involved the United States and citizens of foreign nations.165  To 
Hamilton, justification for federal diversity jurisdiction in such cases came 
down to a simple proposition:  “[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be 
left at the disposal of a PART.”166  Hamilton explained his reasoning:  “The 
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of 
its members.  And the responsibility for an injury ought ever to be 
accompanied with the faculty of preventing it.”167  Thus, according to 
Hamilton, it followed that the federal judiciary should preside over cases 
concerning foreign citizens.168 
Hamilton followed this expansive interpretation of the federal judiciary’s 
authority by proposing a distinction, for the purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction cases involving foreigners, between “cases arising upon treaties 
and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely on the footing of 
the municipal law”:  the former would fall under federal jurisdiction and the 
 
 158. Id. at 222. 
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latter under that of the states.169  Yet, in the same breath, Hamilton 
disavowed the proposal, conceding the inherent difficulty of distinguishing 
run-of-the-mill cases arising under municipal laws from those that may 
affect foreign relations: 
But it is at least problematical whether an unjust sentence against a 
foreigner, where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to the lex 
loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his sovereign . . . . 
And a still greater objection to the distinction would result from the 
immense difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination 
between the cases of one complexion and those of the other.170 
Hamilton argued that all cases that could affect foreign affairs should fall 
under federal jurisdiction because a majority of the cases involving foreign 
parties involve national questions, and it was therefore safer to submit those 
matters to a federal court.171 
Lastly, supporters of dormant foreign affairs preemption draw on 
writings from Thomas Jefferson.  First, Jefferson wrote from Paris at the 
conclusion of the Constitutional Convention about his “general idea” on the 
Constitution.172  Jefferson thought that the states should preserve their 
sovereignty “in whatever concerns themselves alone,” but the federal 
government should retain sovereignty over “whatever may concern another 
State, or any foreign nation.”173  Additionally, in a letter from Jefferson to 
Madison in 1786, Jefferson wrote that “[t]he politics of Europe rendered it 
indispensably necessary that with respect to everything external we be one 
nation firmly hooped together.”174 
b.  The Articles of Confederation 
Supporters of dormant foreign affairs preemption also often highlight that 
the Framers intended the Constitution to remedy certain defects in the 
Articles of Confederation.  For instance, the Articles of Confederation 
provided an ineffective framework for controlling the states, thus 
undermining the national interest in security, diplomacy, and a unified 
international trade policy.175  Moreover, the Confederation government 
lacked the means to maintain a national military, and states had neither the 
means nor the motivation to protect against external security threats to the 
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Confederation.176  Additionally, the national government was limited in its 
ability to bargain effectively with foreign nations, as states pursued their 
own commercial policies with foreign nations and refused to comply with 
national treaty obligations.177  Finally, the national government lacked 
authority to enforce compliance with international law.178 
One incident stands out as a particularly egregious example of state 
noncompliance.  Following the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which required states 
to pay prewar debts to British creditors,179 several states passed legislation 
barring British merchants from collecting on the debts.180  Britain then 
refused to honor its treaty obligations to abandon military outposts along 
the northwestern frontier and barred almost all American goods from 
entering the British West Indies.181  States refused to cooperate with the 
national government’s efforts to normalize trade relations, and retaliated 
against Britain by discriminatorily taxing British imports.182 
3.  Supreme Court Precedent 
Supporters of dormant foreign affairs preemption argue that the Court’s 
precedent supports federal exclusivity in foreign affairs.183  In regard to 
foreign affairs cases generally, supporters draw on dictum from early cases, 
such as Chae Chan Ping v. United States,184 Chy Lung v. Freeman,185 and 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,186 which speak emphatically 
about the federal government’s expansive powers in foreign affairs—or 
foreign affairs as conceived at the time of the cases.187  Conversely, critics 
point out that none of the parties in other early foreign affairs cases, such as 
Ware v. Hylton188 and the Passenger Cases,189 argued that that the 
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Constitution contains a generalized exclusion of states from foreign 
affairs.190 
The Court’s jurisprudence in foreign affairs preemption is of particular 
note.  First, in cases in which the Court holds state statutes unconstitutional 
because of a conflicting federal statute or policy, the Court often refers to 
issues of exclusive federal control over foreign affairs, which would be the 
crucial issue if there were no conflicting federal statute or policy.  Second, 
in cases that deal with the Foreign Commerce Clause or the federal 
common law of foreign relations, the Court addresses the same underlying 
issue as in dormant foreign affairs preemption, which is whether the Court 
should hold a state statute unconstitutional in the absence of a conflicting 
federal statute or policy. 
a.  Statutory Preemption 
Hines v. Davidowitz191 stands as an example of statutory preemption, or 
preemption where there is a conflicting federal statute.192  In 1940, 
Congress enacted the federal Alien Registration Act, which covered many 
of the same areas as a Pennsylvania statute.193  The Court held that the state 
statute conflicted with the federal Alien Registration Act and, pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause, the federal act prevailed.194  The Court was 
principally concerned with local interference with foreign relations195 and 
the delicacy of international relations.196 
While the Court seemed to condone federal exclusivity in foreign 
affairs,197 it was unwilling to endorse preemption of state statutes without a 
conflicting federal statute or policy,198 and expressly refused to condone the 
plaintiffs’ contention that the federal government had exclusive authority 
within the field of regulation and registration of aliens.199  However, the 
Court suggested that it was willing to enjoin enforcement of state statutes 
that conflicted with congressional policy, in addition to federal statutes,200 
which the Court later did under the doctrine of obstacle preemption. 
 
 190. Ramsey, supra note 47, at 418–19. 
 191. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
 192. See supra notes 40–45 and accompanying text. 
 193. Hines, 312 U.S. at 60. 
 194. Id. at 62–63. 
 195. Id. at 63 (“Our system of government is such that the interest of the cities, counties 
and states . . . imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations 
be left entirely free from local interference.”). 
 196. See id. at 64. 
 197. Id. at 63 (“The Federal Government . . . is entrusted with full and exclusive 
responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties.”). 
 198. Id. at 68 & n.22 (“[W]here the Constitution does not of itself prohibit state action, 
. . . and where the Congress, while regulating related matters, has purposely left untouched a 
distinctive part of a subject which is peculiarly adapted to local regulation, the state may 
legislate concerning such local matters which Congress could have covered but did not.”). 
 199. Id. at 61. 
 200. See id. at 67, 70.  On the other hand, Justice Stone expressed reluctance to permit 
preemption in cases where there was only a conflicting federal policy. Id. at 78 (Stone, J., 
dissenting) (“Every Act of Congress occupies some field, but we must know the boundaries 
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b.  Obstacle Preemption 
Two early examples of obstacle preemption, or cases in which the Court 
preempts state laws because of a conflicting federal policy,201 concern 
Russian assets held in the United States after Soviet nationalization of 
private property.  First, in United States v. Belmont,202 the U.S. government 
sought to recover assets deposited by a Russian corporation with a private 
banker in New York City.203  The Court held that the United States was 
entitled to the assets because international compacts entered into by the 
president, though not Senate-ratified treaties, need not take into 
consideration state law or policy:  “[C]omplete power over international 
affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any 
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states.”204  The Court 
further stated that “[g]overnmental power over external affairs is not 
distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government.”205  With 
respect to the current treaty, the federal government could act as if New 
York did not exist.206  Moreover, since the Soviet Union maintained an 
interest in the collection of assigned claims in general, the claims were a 
“public concern, the determination of which well might involve the good 
faith of the United States in the eyes of a foreign government.”207 
The second case, United States v. Pink,208 involved a similar situation.  
The United States sought the recovery of assets of a New York branch of a 
Russian insurance company, which at the time of the suit were in the State 
of New York’s possession.209  The case followed the nationalization of the 
insurance business and the agreement—known as the “Litvinov 
Assignment”—between the two countries.210  The Litvinov Assignment 
entitled the United States to Soviet assets in possession of U.S. nationals in 
the United States.211  The New York Court of Appeals, like the Second 
Circuit in Belmont,212 held that because the property was in New York, 
New York law applied.213  Consequently, New York was entitled to the 
assets because nothing required the court to succumb to a “confiscatory 
decree[].”214 
 
of that field before we can say that it has precluded a state from the exercise of any power 
reserved to it by the Constitution.”). 
 201. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 202. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
 203. Id. at 325–26. 
 204. Id. at 331–32. 
 205. Id. at 330. 
 206. Id. at 331. 
 207. Id. at 327. 
 208. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
 209. Id. at 210. 
 210. Id. at 210–13. 
 211. Id. 
 212. United States v. Belmont, 85 F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1936), rev’d, 301 U.S. 324. 
 213. Pink, 315 U.S. at 220–21. 
 214. Id. at 221. 
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The Court reversed, reiterating its holding in Belmont that state laws and 
policies must always yield to federal foreign affairs policies:  “We repeat 
that there are limitations on the sovereignty of the States.  No State can 
rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies.  Power 
over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national 
government exclusively.”215  The Court was concerned that other countries 
would hold the United States as a whole accountable for difficulties created 
by individual states.216 
Just as the Court in Belmont recognized the positive interests of adhering 
to the federal government’s policy, the Court in Pink asserted the dangers of 
deviation from federal policy.217  The Litvinov Assignment was intended 
“to eliminate all possible sources of friction,” and the unpaid claims “had 
long been one impediment to resumption of friendly relations.”218  The 
New York Court of Appeals, by refusing to give force to the federal policy, 
had disapproved of or refused to recognize nationalization under the Soviet 
Union in the face of the national government’s acceptance.219  Thus, New 
York had “restore[d] some of the precise irritants which had long affected 
the relations between these two great nations and which the policy of 
recognition was designed to eliminate.”220 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council221 is a more recent example in 
which the Court preempted a state statute because it conflicted with federal 
policy.222  In this case, state officials petitioned the Court to overturn the 
First Circuit’s judgment holding a Massachusetts state law 
unconstitutional.223  The Massachusetts law “generally bar[red] state 
entities from buying goods or services from any person . . . identified on a 
restricted purchase list of those doing business with Burma,” with some 
exceptions and exemptions.224  Soon after Massachusetts passed the law, 
Congress enacted a statute “imposing a set of mandatory and conditional 
sanctions on Burma.”225  The federal act also authorized the president to 
impose further conditional sanctions on Burma, as well as “to develop ‘a 
. . . strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices and 
the quality of life in Burma.’”226 
The Court affirmed the First Circuit’s judgment, holding that the 
Massachusetts law was preempted and therefore unconstitutional under the 
Supremacy Clause because it “conflict[ed] with Congress’s specific 
 
 215. Id. at 233. 
 216. Id. at 232. 
 217. Id. at 225, 231–32. 
 218. Id. at 225. 
 219. Id. at 231–32. 
 220. Id. at 232. 
 221. 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 222. Id. at 371. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 225. Id. at 368. 
 226. Id. at 369 (quoting Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act § 570, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167 (1997)). 
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delegation to the President” of power227 and “undermine[d] the intended 
purpose and ‘natural effect’ of . . . three provisions of [a] federal Act.”228  
The Court was principally concerned with the Massachusetts statute’s effect 
on the president’s ability to conduct diplomacy, since the statute 
“compromise[d] the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation 
with one voice in dealing with other governments.”229 
c.  Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause Preemption 
This concern for speaking with one voice also plays a central role in the 
Court’s dormant Foreign Commerce Clause preemption jurisprudence.  An 
example of preemption of state law under the Foreign Commerce Clause is 
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.230  In Japan Line, Ltd., the Court 
held that a California property tax violated two additional tests that come 
into play when a state seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign, as 
opposed to interstate, commerce.231  The Court considered whether the tax 
“creates a substantial risk of international multiple taxation, and, second, 
whether the tax prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one 
voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.’”232 
Soon after Japan Line, Ltd., the Court limited the scope of the Foreign 
Commerce Clause.  For example, in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax 
Board,233 the Court held that a state tax did not “impair federal uniformity 
in an area where federal uniformity is essential,”234 reasoning that 
Congress, “whose voice, in this area, is the Nation’s,” was the proper place 
“to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, 
or state autonomy.”235  Not only did the Court hold that Congress was the 
proper place for such an inquiry, but it also specifically held that “[t]he 
judiciary is not vested with power to decide ‘how to balance a particular 
risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole 
to let the States tax as they please.’”236  Moreover, the Court held that 
Congress had passively indicated its consent to the tax by not enacting 
legislation to the contrary in the face of explicit international displeasure.237  
The Court would also have required “specific indications of congressional 
intent” to find congressional disapproval.238  Finally, the Court held that 
executive statements, which could have been interpreted as executive 
disapproval of the worldwide combined reporting system, were insufficient 
 
 227. Id. at 388. 
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(1983)). 
 237. Id. at 324 & n.22. 
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to prove unconstitutionality under the Foreign Commerce Clause.239  The 
Court emphasized separation of powers, holding that “[t]he Constitution 
expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power to ‘regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations.’”240 
d.  The Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations 
The Supreme Court applied federal common law of foreign relations in 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.241  In Sabbatino, a Cuban bank sued 
an American commodities broker to recover proceeds from a shipment of 
sugar that the Cuban government had expropriated in response to a U.S. 
reduction of the sugar quota for Cuba.242  The Cuban bank argued that the 
act of state doctrine proscribed judicial inquiry into the validity of the 
Cuban government’s expropriation of the sugar.243  The act of state doctrine 
prevents the courts of a country from “sit[ting] in judgment on the acts of 
the government of another done within its own territory.”244  The American 
commodities broker argued that the expropriation violated international law 
because of a “combination of retaliation, discrimination, and inadequate 
compensation,” and that the act of state doctrine did not apply to actions 
that violated international law.245 
The Court ultimately held that there was no exception to the act of state 
doctrine for violations of international law, and therefore the Court could 
not inquire into the validity of the expropriation.246  Furthermore, the Court 
explicitly held that state courts must also follow the act of state doctrine:  
“the problems involved are uniquely federal in nature” and if “the state 
courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the 
doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal 
pronouncement on the subject.”247  Even after acknowledging that New 
York had adopted the act of state doctrine, and therefore indicating that the 
Court could have avoided the question of whether federal or state law 
applied, the Court held that the issue “must be treated exclusively as an 
aspect of federal law,” and that the issue was beyond the scope of the Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins doctrine.248 
The Court also directly addressed the question of the legal basis for 
mandating acceptance of the act of state doctrine.249  The Court held that 
the act of state doctrine was neither compelled by international law,250 nor 
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by the text of the Constitution itself.251  Instead, the act of state doctrine has 
“constitutional underpinnings”:  “[i]t arises out of the basic relationships 
between branches of government in a system of separation of powers” and 
concerns the competency of certain branches to make decisions in the area 
of international relations.252 
II.  RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 
The law governing the recognition of foreign judgments captures the 
competing interests in current dormant foreign affairs preemption analyses.  
State regulation over the recognition of foreign judgments can be viewed as 
both a traditional state activity and an area of law that has an impact on 
foreign affairs.  In fact, Justice Harlan drew on recognition of foreign 
judgments in his Zschernig concurrence to highlight the inadequacy of the 
Court’s new dormant foreign affairs preemption standard.253  He 
emphasized that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act 
(UFMJRA), which a majority of states adopted to regulate their recognition 
of foreign judgments,254 had the same defect that caused the Court to strike 
down the state law in that case.255  Yet, the Court would not want to find it 
unconstitutional.256  Furthermore, while some courts apply state law 
governing the recognition of foreign judgments, other courts continue to 
equivocate between applying state law and federal common law,257 and 
sometimes even explicitly apply federal common law.258 
Part II.A introduces the law governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments, with emphasis on the pivotal case, Hilton v. Guyot,259 modern 
recognition law under the UFMJRA, and federal preemption of state libel 
tourism laws.  Part II.B reviews recognition law’s impact on foreign affairs, 
looking at Chevron Corp. v. Donziger260 to ascertain the comity concerns in 
the refusal to recognize a judgment, and the “international” due process 
analysis for an example of unavoidable judicial criticism inherent in 
recognition cases. 
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A.  The Law Governing the Recognition of  
Foreign Money Judgments 
This section outlines the current state of the law governing the 
recognition of foreign money judgments.  First, the Supreme Court set out 
basic conditions for the recognition of foreign judgments in Hilton.261  
Second, after the Court held in Erie that federal courts sitting in diversity 
should apply the substantive law of the state in which the court sits,262 a 
majority of the states adopted the UFMJRA as their substantive law 
governing the recognition of foreign judgments.  Finally, the federal 
government has recently preempted state law governing the recognition of 
foreign libel judgments. 
1.  Recognition Law 
Judgments are typically “final,” meaning that they are entitled to res 
judicata and collateral estoppel effects, and thus “bar[] the relitigation of the 
same claims in a second court or, in many cases, relitigation of issues on 
which a party has previously litigated and lost.”263  Foreign judgments, 
however, must first be recognized before they are enforced.264  
“Recognition” therefore denotes “the res judicata status of a foreign 
judgment.”265  A court’s recognition of a foreign judgment is equivalent to 
saying that the foreign adjudication is binding on the parties.266 
Enforcement of a judgment is necessary when a defendant requires 
judicial compulsion to pay on a judgment that the United States has 
recognized or rendered.267  “Enforcement” of a judgment thus refers to the 
“authorization of affirmative relief based on the foreign judgment;” it is a 
“domestic judgment rendered pursuant to a claim predicated upon the 
foreign judgment.”268  Therefore, a foreign judgment must be recognized 
before it is enforced,269 and once a judgment is recognized in one state, all 
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American courts must enforce it regardless of their own recognition 
laws.270  Judgments are also recognized for purposes other than 
enforcement.271  For example, recognition issues may arise where a party 
seeks to rely upon the res judicata effect of a prior adjudication, or where a 
party seeks to rely on a prior determination of fact or law.272 
The U.S. Constitution does not discuss the recognition of judgments 
obtained in other countries.273  The Court, however, set out conditions for 
recognition of foreign judgments in Hilton, which involved a French 
liquidator’s attempt to recover upon a judgment entered in a French court in 
Paris.274  The central issue was whether foreign judgments could be 
reexamined on their merits.275  According to the Court in Hilton, a court 
should recognize a judgment where:  (1) there has been regular proceedings 
and an opportunity for a “full and fair trial abroad before a court of 
competent jurisdiction”; (2) there has been “due citation” or the defendant 
voluntarily appeared; (3) there was a “system of jurisprudence likely to 
secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own 
country and those of other countries”; and (4) there was no prejudice in the 
court, nor fraud in procuring the judgment.276 
However, the Court did not evaluate whether the judgment met those 
conditions.277  The Court instead held that a party seeking recognition of a 
foreign jurdgment must first prove “reciprocity,” a requirement that was not 
satisfied in this case.278  The Court held that reciprocity requires that the 
country of the rendering court give effect to judgments entered in the 
United States.279  Since France would not give judgments entered in the 
United States conclusive effect, the Court would treat French judgments 
merely as prima facie evidence of the plaintiff’s claim.280  The foundation 
for the Court’s decision to include reciprocity, besides an extensive analysis 
of the treatment of foreign judgments in other countries,281 was a belief in 
an underlying “comity of nations.”282  The dissent, on the other hand, 
would not have required reciprocity, and characterized foreign judgments as 
“private rights acquired under foreign laws,” which are enforceable unless 
contrary to a state’s public policy.283 
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While the Hilton conditions—mostly without reciprocity—still guide the 
decisions of courts today,284 some state courts did not consider Hilton 
binding.285  For instance, in Johnston v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique,286 the New York Court of Appeals expressly refused to 
follow Hilton.287  A U.S. plaintiff had brought suit in France against a 
French steamship carrier after the steamship carrier allegedly delivered 
goods to a wrong party.288  The French court ruled in favor of the steamship 
carrier, but the same plaintiff sued the carrier in New York on the same 
grounds.289  The lower courts followed Hilton and refused to give effect to 
the French judgment for want of reciprocity.290 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the court was not 
bound to follow Hilton’s reciprocity requirement.291  The court recognized 
the federal government’s possible foreign affairs interest in the recognition 
of foreign judgments, but determined that the federal government’s interest 
did not give rise to exclusive federal authority in the domain.292  The court, 
like the dissent in Hilton, interpreted the question to be “one of private 
rather than public international law, of private right rather than public 
relations.”293  Further, in holding that New York did not require reciprocity, 
the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that comity “rests, not on the 
basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the persuasiveness of the foreign 
judgment.”294  Since reciprocity was the sole basis for refusing to recognize 
the French court’s judgment, the court reversed.295 
2.  The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments  
Recognition Act 
Since Erie, state law has generally governed the recognition of foreign 
monetary judgments.296  However, the fractured judgment recognition 
system proved problematic for enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad, as 
some civil law nations that required reciprocity were not satisfied that it 
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existed in the United States.297  The consequent need for codification and 
unification of recognition law prompted the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to draft the UFMJRA 
in 1962.298  The drafters intended to encourage the equal treatment of 
judgments rendered abroad with judgments entered in sister states in order 
to facilitate the enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad.299  Although the 
United States is generally considered one of the nations most receptive to 
the recognition of foreign judgments, the drafters of the UFMJRA intended 
to expand recognition for foreign judgments.300 
The UFMJRA, which is based on Hilton,301 codified common law and 
provided “skeletal” procedures for recognition and enforcement.302  Under 
the UFMJRA, a judgment creditor must show that a judgment is “final and 
conclusive and enforceable where rendered.”303  A judgment debtor can 
contest the conclusiveness of a judgment on mandatory grounds, upon proof 
of which a court must refuse recognition of the judgment, or permissive 
grounds, proof of which allows a court discretion to dismiss for 
nonrecognition.304  The three mandatory grounds for nonrecognition 
include when:  (1) the foreign court’s system lacked “impartial tribunals or 
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law”; (2) the 
foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and 
(3) the foreign court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.305  The six 
permissive grounds for nonrecognition include if:  (1) the defendant did not 
receive notice; (2) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (3) satisfaction of 
the underlying claim would violate the public policy of the state; (4) the 
judgment conflicts with another conclusive judgment; (5) the parties agreed 
to have their claims heard in an alternate forum; and (6) in cases where 
jurisdiction is based on personal service and “the foreign court was a 
seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.”306 
Although thirty-one states have adopted the UFMJRA in some form,307 
the laws within those states are still not uniform.308  While some states 
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adopted the UFMJRA in its entirety, others adopted “only those portions 
that mirrored their already established common law.”309  Even those states 
that adopted the UFMJRA in its entirety may still apply their pre-UFMJRA 
rules.310 
The NCCUSL proposed the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act (UFCMJRA),311 a revision to the UFMJRA, in 2005.312  
The drafters of the UFCMJRA intended to further increase the certainty and 
uniformity provided by the original UFMJRA in order to facilitate 
international commercial transactions.313  The UFCMJRA updated the 
definitions section, clarified the scope of the Act, set out recognition 
procedural mechanisms, expanded the grounds for nonrecognition, 
allocated the Act’s burden of proof for application of the Act and for 
maintaining nonrecognition, and established a statute of limitations.314  
Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UFCMJRA, 
and three have introduced it in some form.315 
3.  The SPEECH Act:  Federal Preemption of  
“Libel Tourism” Laws 
State law does not govern all cases concerning the recognition of foreign 
judgments.  Federal law exclusively governs the recognition of foreign libel 
judgments,316 an area of law that raises both domestic and foreign policy 
concerns.  Congress passed the Securing the Protection of Our Enduring 
and Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act317 in August 
2010.318  The legislation prohibits recognition or enforcement of a foreign 
judgment for defamation unless a foreign court “provided at least as much 
protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as would be 
provided by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
and by the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is 
located,” or if the defendant would have been found liable for defamation 
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under U.S. and the domestic state’s law.319  The Act followed similar state 
iterations, such as New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act,320 although 
once passed the SPEECH Act preempted state law governing the 
enforcement of foreign libel judgments.321 
The legislation was a response to “[l]ibel tourism,” or “the practice of 
obstructing the First Amendment by suing American authors and publishers 
for defamation in foreign courts where a lower legal standard allows for 
easier recovery.”322  In other words, plaintiffs often choose to bring libel 
suits against U.S. journalists, writers, and publishers in foreign 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, because such jurisdictions have 
harsh libel laws, whereas the United States has substantial free speech 
protections under the First Amendment.323  For instance, the United States 
places a heavy burden on plaintiffs in libel actions to prove that the 
statement at issue is false and was made maliciously, while the United 
Kingdom has a presumption that the statement at issue is false.324 
Additionally, minimum-contacts personal jurisdiction is easier to 
establish in the United Kingdom.325  The issue is especially salient in an age 
of common international dissemination of written works.326  U.S. authors 
were previously able to keep “out of reach of the long arm of the British 
courts . . . .  [However,] in an era of massive global communications, it is 
sometimes impossible to keep a written work from disseminating 
internationally.”327 
For example, in the lawsuit that precipitated the SPEECH Act and its 
state law predecessors, the author Rachel Ehrenfeld had not published her 
book Funding Evil:  How Terrorism Is Financed—And How To Stop It in 
the United Kingdom, but she had posted parts of the book on the Internet, 
and twenty-three copies ended up in the United Kingdom.328  In the book, 
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Ehrenfeld accused a Saudi Arabian billionaire of supporting terrorism.329  
The billionaire had previously been convicted of money laundering, 
bribery, supporting terrorism, arms trafficking, and many other crimes, and 
he had also brought over twenty-nine libel suits in the United Kingdom 
alone.330  Ehrenfeld could not defend the suit because it was too expensive 
to litigate in the United Kingdom.331  The British court consequently 
entered a $200,000 default judgment against her.332 
The domestic concern with libel tourism is that it has the effect of 
chilling free speech.333  If American writers can be subject to any 
jurisdiction’s libel laws, then writers who do not want to fall victim to such 
laws must be cognizant of them all, including those with strict limitations 
on free speech.334  This “cuts off the free flow of information that should 
reach the public, and instead silences authors and journalists.”335 
Commentators have also expressed “comity concerns” over “the 
collateral effects of U.S. legislation aimed at curbing libel tourism”:  
“[s]uch legislation has the ability to impact much more than just defamation 
actions—it might well create foreign policy friction among nations that, in 
the normal course of business, would respect valid judgments rendered in 
one another’s courts.”336  Additionally, the states’ pre-SPEECH Act 
responses raised “serious concerns about consistency, particularly in an area 
where the sensitivities of foreign nations are at stake and where principles 
of federal constitutional law are driving the laws’ enactments.”337 
B.  Recognition Law:  Impact on Foreign Affairs 
This section analyzes the impact of laws governing the recognition of 
foreign judgments on foreign affairs.  First, the cases involving Chevron 
illustrate that there are comity concerns in cases where courts refuse to 
recognize foreign judgments or enjoin other courts from recognizing 
judgments.  Second, courts applying the international due process standard 
 
 329. Id. at 912. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 426. 
 333. Gerny, supra note 322, at 413. 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Klein, supra note 320, at 387; see also David A. Anderson, Transnational Libel, 53 
VA. J. INT’L L. 71, 72 (2012) (“The SPEECH Act sets aside hard-won concepts of 
international comity in favor of unilateral fiat.”); Doug Rendleman, Collecting a Libel 
Tourist’s Defamation Judgment?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 487 (2010) (“[The] panoptic 
rejection of all foreign-nation defamation judgments is both too blunt and too broad.  The 
idea, moreover, that a foreign nation’s substantive law is ‘repugnant’ unless it is identical to 
ours is itself a repugnant one.”); Todd W. Moore, Note, Untying Our Hands:  The Case for 
Uniform Personal Jurisdiction Over “Libel Tourists,” 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3207, 3236 
(2009); John J. Walsh, The Myth of ‘Libel Tourism,’ N.Y. L.J., Nov. 20, 2007, at 2 (arguing 
that domestic borders limit the principles of the First Amendment and that the myth of “libel 
tourism” threatens “long-standing and important relationships”). 
 337. Klein, supra note 320, at 383. 
2350 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
are examples of the unavoidable judicial criticism inherent in recognition 
cases. 
1.  Nonrecognition of Foreign Judgments:  The Multibillion-Dollar 
Judgment Between Chevron and the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs 
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger338 and Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo339 show 
that the refusal to recognize a foreign judgment can itself raise foreign 
policy concerns.340  In March 2011, the district court in Donziger, applying 
New York’s law on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, a 
version of the UFCMJRA341 (New York’s Recognition Law), granted a 
global antienforcement injunction of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs’ $18 billion 
Ecuadoran judgment.342  First, the court held that it was likely to conclude 
that Ecuador’s legal system did not provide an impartial tribunal or 
procedures compatible with due process of law, and therefore the court 
would not be able to recognize or enforce the judgment in New York.343  
Second, the court held that a declaratory judgment would “finally determine 
the controversy over enforceability.”344  The court held that the injunction 
should extend worldwide because of the interests in equity and finality and 
because the controversy over the judgment was global—the Lago Agrio 
plaintiffs had stated that they intended to pursue enforcement of the 
judgment in multiple jurisdictions worldwide as soon as possible.345 
Although the district court took note of international comity 
considerations,346 it viewed those concerns as “trees” that could obstruct 
sight of the “forest.”347  The court reasoned that the Lago Agrio plaintiffs 
were, like Chevron, simply engaging in “procedural fencing,” as they hoped 
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to benefit from the burdens imposed by instituting enforcement proceedings 
in multiple jurisdictions.348  Furthermore, the court concluded that equity 
concerns in finality outweighed comity concerns, because comity concerns 
are an unavoidable aspect of recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments: 
Ecuador doubtless would rather not have the judgment or its legal system 
called into question.  To that extent, there is bound to be a certain amount 
of friction . . . .  [T]he fact that the judgment and the forum in which it 
was rendered are open to attack in the forum where enforcement is sought 
is inherent in the international scheme.349 
The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction, holding that 
Chevron would have to wait to contest the validity of the judgment until the 
Lago Agrio plaintiffs chose to bring an action for recognition and 
enforcement.350  New York’s Recognition Law did not authorize “a court to 
declare a foreign judgment unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a 
putative judgment-debtor.”351  Furthermore, the principles embedded in 
New York’s Recognition Law were “motivated by an interest to provide for 
the enforcement of foreign judgments, not to prevent them.”352 
Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit did not reject international 
comity concerns.353  First, New York’s legislature did not intend to create a 
cause of action that would “preempt the courts of other countries from 
making their own decisions about the enforceability of such judgments.”354  
New York had adopted a statute that sought to provide a ready means for 
enforcement of foreign judgments in New York, while reserving New 
York’s right to decline enforcement of “fraudulent ‘judgments’ obtained in 
corrupt legal systems.”355  In this way, “New York undertook to act as a 
responsible participant in an international system of justice—not to set up 
its courts as a transnational arbiter to dictate to the entire world which 
judgments are entitled to respect and which countries’ courts are to be 
treated as international pariahs.”356  Moreover, New York’s Recognition 
Law was designed to instill trust in the enforcement-facilitation 
framework.357  In particular, the due process exception was meant “to 
facilitate trust among nations and their judicial systems by preventing one 
jurisdiction from using the trappings of sovereignty to engage in a sort of 
seignorage by which easy judgments are minted and sold to any plaintiff 
willing to pay for them.”358 
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The Second Circuit, like the district court, spoke specifically of the 
international comity concerns inherent simply in cases of nonrecognition of 
foreign judgments:  “It is a particularly weighty matter for a court in one 
country to declare that another country’s legal system is so corrupt or unfair 
that its judgments are entitled to no respect from the courts of other 
nations.”359  Further, the Second Circuit emphasized that the comity 
concerns “become far graver” if “a court in one country attempts to 
preclude the courts of every other nation from ever considering the effect of 
that foreign judgment.”360  When a court acts in this way, it 
risks disrespecting the legal system not only of the country in which the 
judgment was issued, but also those of other countries, who are inherently 
assumed insufficiently trustworthy to recognize what is asserted to be the 
extreme incapacity of the legal system from which the judgment 
emanates.  The court presuming to issue such an injunction sets itself up 
as the definitive international arbiter of the fairness and integrity of the 
world’s legal systems.361 
While the court premised its holding on New York’s Recognition Law, the 
court was clearly concerned with the international repercussions of the 
district court’s decision.362 
Scholars have also noted the foreign affairs implications emanating from 
the Chevron litigation.  Daniel Restrepo, President Obama’s former primary 
advisor on the Western Hemisphere, argues that the lawsuits against 
Chevron have affected the United States’ relationship with Ecuador.363  For 
example, Restrepo contends that the lawsuits have colored discussions 
under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, even though 
many countries, including the United States, tend to invoke “judicial 
independence” when faced with complaints about their judicial 
processes.364 
2.  The International Due Process Analysis 
Courts applying the UFMJRA must evaluate the procedural adequacy of 
a rendering court’s judiciary system,365 which also raises the specter of 
unavoidable judicial criticism of other nations.366  The UFMJRA prohibits 
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recognition of foreign judgments that are “rendered under a system which 
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the 
requirements of due process of law.”367  This has been interpreted as 
requiring procedures that are “‘fundamentally fair’ and do not offend 
against ‘basic fairness,’”368 which is “the basis for the . . . international due 
process exception to foreign judgment recognition.”369 
Courts applying this international due process standard have sorted 
countries into those with and those without fundamentally fair procedures.  
For example, in the leading case on “international” due process, Society of 
Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, a foreign corporation brought suit against American 
members of the corporation’s insurance syndicates under the Illinois 
version of the UFMJRA for recognition and enforcement of money 
judgments entered in an English court.370  First, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the reference to due process in the UFMJRA indicated “a concept of 
fair procedure simple and basic enough to describe the judicial processes of 
civilized nations, our peers.”371  The UFMJRA required procedures that are 
on the whole—not necessarily in the specific proceeding at issue—
“‘fundamentally fair’ and do not offend against ‘basic fairness,’” although 
not procedures that are identical to those in the United States.372 
The court affirmed recognition of the judgment because it did not violate 
the “international” due process standard.373  The court held that while 
parties could potentially offer evidence to impinge the available 
proceedings in “Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Congo, or some other nation 
whose adherence to the rule of law and commitment to the norm of due 
process are open to serious question,” England has a civilized legal system, 
and that any suggestion to the contrary “borders on the risible.”374 
In two other cases involving different countries—Iran and Liberia—
courts came to the opposite conclusion under the “international” due 
process standard.  However, like in Society of Lloyd’s, these courts did not 
review the specifics of the individual foreign proceedings.375  In the first 
case, Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi,376 two Iranian banks sought recognition 
and enforcement of judgments against the sister of the former Shah of Iran, 
a California resident.377  The court refused to recognize the judgment, 
finding that the Shah’s sister “could not expect fair treatment from the 
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courts of Iran, could not personally appear before those courts, could not 
obtain proper legal representation in Iran, and could not even obtain local 
witnesses on her behalf,” all of which “are ingredients of basic due 
process.”378  The court based its holding on consular information sheets 
containing travel advisories, a 1991 report on terrorism, Department of 
State documents, country reports, a declaration from a State department 
official, and prior U.S. court decisions recognizing that “in the early to mid-
1980s Americans could not get a fair trial in Iran.”379 
Similarly, in Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank,380 a Liberian corporation 
sought recognition and enforcement of a judgment against Citibank, which 
had previously maintained a branch in Monrovia, Liberia.381  The district 
court sua sponte granted summary judgment, refusing to recognize the 
judgment because Liberia’s courts were unlikely to “secure an impartial 
administration of justice.”382  The circuit court affirmed, holding that during 
the relevant time period, which coincided with the Liberian civil war, 
“Liberia’s judicial system was in a state of disarray,”383 and that “the chaos 
within the Liberian judicial system” was enough proof, as a matter of law, 
that there was an inadequate guarantee of procedural due process.384 
III.  AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR DORMANT  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS PREEMPTION 
This section critiques current standards applied under dormant foreign 
affairs preemption, proposes an objective standard that looks to the 
reasonable expectations of other sovereigns, and evaluates the laws 
governing the recognition of foreign judgments under the new standard. 
A.  Current Standards 
The Supreme Court’s standards for dormant foreign affairs preemption—
the holding in Zschernig385 and the proposed test in Garamendi386—are 
inadequate.  The Court’s standard in Zschernig is deficient in two ways.  
First, it is overinclusive.  Under the Zschernig standard, state laws that have 
a direct impact on foreign relations are unconstitutional, without regard for 
state sovereignty.387  Second, the standard is unclear in its reasoning and 
scope, particularly due to the lack of an adequate definition for what 
 
 378. Id. at 1413.  The court looked to federal common law to make its determination. See 
id. at 1409 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)). 
 379. Id. at 1412. 
 380. 201 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 381. Id. at 138. 
 382. Id. at 139. 
 383. Id. at 138. 
 384. Id. at 142.  The court in Citibank also noted that while the district court applied New 
York law, federal law might have been applicable. Id. at 141 n.1.  However, it was not 
necessary to decide the issue, because of the similarities between the two standards. Id. 
 385. 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968). 
 386. 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.11 (2003). 
 387. See supra notes 55–69 and accompanying text. 
2014] COMITY CONCERNS ARE NO JOKE 2355 
impacts foreign relations.388  For example, under this standard, courts 
should hold state laws governing the recognition of foreign judgments 
unconstitutional solely because of their impact on foreign relations.389  
Such an analysis fails to consider the states’ interests in continued 
regulation of the recognition of foreign judgments. 
While the Court’s proposed standard in Garamendi considers state 
sovereignty, the standard is problematic in multiple ways.  First, the 
standard would impose a difficult and ambiguous balancing test.390  A court 
would first have to determine whether a state law is within a state’s 
traditional competence and, if it is, require the substantiality of the conflict 
to vary with the strength of the asserted state interest.391  The court would 
then possibly have to weigh the federal foreign policy interest against the 
state interest and substantiality of the conflict.392  For example, if a court 
classified a state law governing the recognition of foreign judgments as 
within an area of traditional state competence, the court would then have to 
weigh the state law against the federal law and determine the strength of the 
conflict.  It is unclear, however, how strong of a conflict would mandate 
preemption and how foreign affairs interests would factor in. 
The Garamendi standard is also problematic because it relies on an 
antiquated categorization—traditional state competence—which fails to 
account for laws that affect modern notions of foreign relations.  Foreign 
relations traditionally referred to the relationship between national 
governments, which mainly encompassed diplomatic and military issues.393  
These issues are mostly accounted for in Article I, Section 10 of the 
Constitution.394  The last thirty years, however, have seen an increase in the 
“integration of the international economy, changes in transportation and 
communications technology, and the growth of international law and 
iustitutions [sic].”395  Increases in international cooperation, coordination, 
and regulation have blurred the line between foreign and domestic 
relations.396  For example, areas of law that were formerly solely domestic 
concerns but are now foreign affairs concerns include “trade, investment, 
technology and energy transfers, environmental and social issues, cultural 
exchanges, migratory and commuting labour, . . . transfrontier drug traffic 
and epidemics,” and even the manner in which a nation treats its own 
citizens.397  Furthermore, domestic activity increasingly has consequences 
abroad and vice versa, and the participants in foreign relations have 
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changed.398  The recognition of foreign judgments is an example of an area 
of law that would not fall under the traditional notion of foreign affairs and 
yet may have a substantial impact on modern conceptions of foreign 
affairs.399 
B.  An Objective Standard 
Instead, courts should analyze dormant foreign affairs preemption issues 
under an objective standard.  The analysis should look to whether another 
sovereign would reasonably expect the federal government to have 
exclusive jurisdiction over a type or body of law.  This inquiry is objective 
in that it focuses on the reasonableness of exclusive federal jurisdiction, 
rather than the purpose behind a state law or the actual expectations of other 
sovereigns. 
Courts should rely on an objective standard for a number of reasons.  
First, the analysis incorporates a flexible and realistic standard for 
evaluating a state law’s impact on foreign affairs.  In this inquiry, only 
reasonable expectations regarding laws and their possible impact on the 
relationships between the United States and other countries define what can 
have an impact on “foreign affairs,” rather than relying on outdated notions 
of foreign affairs and areas of traditional state competence.  In this way, the 
objective standard serves the main goal of dormant foreign affairs 
preemption—to prevent state interference in areas of law that affect the 
United States’ relationships with other countries. 
Additionally, the analysis protects state sovereignty, because a court can 
look to a law’s contacts with other areas of federal and state law, as a 
sovereign would reasonably expect the United States to treat similar laws 
alike.  This is also advantageous because it does not rely on the outdated 
“traditional competence” categorization and avoids the traditional 
competence’s circular inquiry—states should maintain jurisdiction because 
they have always had jurisdiction. 
C.  Recognition of Foreign Judgments  
Under the Objective Standard 
Under the objective standard, the federal government should have 
exclusive jurisdiction over laws governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments.  When looking to whether another sovereign would reasonably 
expect the federal government to have exclusive jurisdiction over a type or 
body of law, the first issue is the extent to which a law may have an impact 
on foreign relations.  The second analysis is the extent of the law’s contacts 
with federal and state law. 
Decisions made under the law governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments can have a substantial impact on foreign affairs.  First, state 
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variations in recognition laws present all of the lack of uniformity problems 
that were raised by the Founders,400 are still raised in Foreign Commerce 
Clause preemption401 and federal common law of foreign relation cases,402 
and prompted reform under the UFMJRA.403  Second, the act of refusing to 
recognize a judgment implicates comity concerns.404  Further, the power to 
enjoin courts of other countries presents even greater comity concerns.405  
Relatedly, a state’s ability to manipulate its laws on recognition of foreign 
judgments allows a state to participate in international forum shopping.  For 
example, flexible recognition laws may cause a state to become an 
international forum for the recognition of foreign judgments.  On the flip 
side, a state with more severe requirements may become an international 
pariah.  Finally, the international due process standard allows judges to 
criticize the judicial systems of other countries, often on little more than a 
surface evaluation.406  This is exactly the kind of judicial inquiry that 
persuaded the Court in Zschernig to hold the state statute 
unconstitutional.407 
Contacts with state and federal law may also support exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over the recognition of foreign judgments.  On one hand, laws 
governing the recognition of foreign judgments have substantial contacts 
with state law.  Most significantly, states regulate the recognition and 
enforcement of sister states’ judgments.  States in those cases, however, 
need not consider international issues.  On the other hand, the federal 
government already regulates a subset of recognition law under the 
SPEECH Act.408  While domestic concerns over libel tourism prompted 
federal intervention, considerations of international comity and foreign 
affairs—such as the need for consistency across states and avoiding state-
created friction in foreign relations—bolstered the case for federal 
intervention,409 and are still relevant in nonlibel foreign recognition cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The objective standard for dormant foreign affairs preemption takes into 
account changing notions of foreign affairs and protects encroachment on 
state sovereignty.  The objective standard is even more important as notions 
of what constitutes foreign affairs change and areas of law that were 
traditionally reserved for the states increasingly affect foreign affairs.  The 
law governing the recognition of foreign judgments is an example of a body 
of law that the federal government should have exclusive jurisdiction over.  
 
 400. See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 401. See supra Part I.C.3.c. 
 402. See supra Part I.C.3.d. 
 403. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 404. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 405. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 406. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 407. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440–441 (1968). 
 408. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 409. See supra notes 336–37. 
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Although states have traditionally regulated the recognition of foreign 
judgments, recognition laws and decisions made under recognition laws 
have a substantial and growing impact on modern conceptions of foreign 
affairs. 
 
